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PART I INTRODUCTION 
A GENERAL 
Chari tab le activity has had an great inf 1 uence in the history 
o f New Zealand and this inf 1 uence continues . The number of 
charitable bodies is large and continues to grow. Some bodies 
are smal 1 and operate at street leve 1, others are international 
mu ltimi 1 lion dollar organizations . Chari tab le trusts are also 
c reated from time to time. A charitable trust is created 
whenever a person gives property to another person , called a 
t rustee , on the basis that they will hold the property for some 
charitable objects . The trustee is compelled in equity to deal 
with the property in such a way that the real benefit of the 
property accrues to the objects of the trust. The giving of one 's 
time and resources to help others not because one is required 
to do so or will make money from it, but because it is for the 
good of the community, is an activity that governments have 
for many years thought fit to encourage and subsidise . To this 
end the law endows charities with certain privileges. These 
are : 
1 A charitable trust can be made to last perpetual! y, 
provided it vests within the re le van t perpetuity 
period . This differs from a non-charitable trust which 
wi 11 be void if it is made to last perpetual! y . 
2 Chari tab le trusts do not require a human beneficiary 
to enforce them as do non-charitable trusts . 
3 Uncertainty as to object will not invalidate a 
charitable trust as it will a non-charaitable trust . 
LAW LIBRARY 
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4 Chari tab le trusts enjoy various advantages in respect 
of taxation. 
In addition to these legal advantages charitable status has 
c ome to symbolise stability and respectability . 
It is clear that decisions in respect of the definition of 
charity have social implications. The judge in deciding what is 
charitable is making a decision of great importance . He or she 
i s determining the areas in to which benevolence can be 
d irected with the greatest effect. Nevertheless it is almost 
i mpossible to determine the general policy on which the 
d ecisions are made . Lord Sterndale, M .R . in Re Tetley1 makes 
t his point clear 1 y : 
"I am unable to find any principle which wi 11 guide one 
easily, and safely, through the tangle of the cases as to 
what is and what is not a charitable gift . If it is possible 
I hope sincerely that at some time or other a principle 
wi 11 be laid down . The who le subject is in an artificial 
atmosphere altogether. A large number of gifts are held 
charitable which would not be called charitable in the 
ordinary acceptation of the term, and when one takes 
gifts which have been held not to be charitable, it is 
very difficu 1 t to see what the principle is on which the 
distinction rests ." 
Since charities are endorsed with the privileges described 
above, and also given direct government subsidisation, it is 
essential for the scope of charities to be proper 1 y defined . 
The issue of which activities the government is prepared to 
Re Tetley [1923] 1 Ch 258, 266. 
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encourage and subsidise is a crucial one and is one of concern 
to the many taxpayers who provide for the millions of dollars 
worth of fiscal privileges which charities enjoy each year. It is 
also a crucial issue for the many organisations which each 
y ear endeavour to establish themselves as charitable bodies. 
This paper aims to highlight the problems with the present 
definition of charity, and to consider some possible approaches 
to reformulating the definition . 
B LEGAL DEFINITION OF CHARITY 
The starting point for any discussion on the legal definition 
of charity must be the Charitable Uses Act 1601. The preamble 
to the Act lists the following purposes as being charitable : 
"The re lief of aged, impotent and poor people ; the 
maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners; 
schools of learning, free schools, and scholars of 
universities; the repair of bridges, ports, havens, 
causeways, churches, seabanks and highways; the 
education and preferment of orphans; the relief, stock 
of maintenance for houses of correction; the marriage 
of poor maids; the supportation, aid and help of young 
tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed; the 
aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning 
payment" . 
The preamble does not purport to be an exhaustive list of 
charitable purposes, but provides general guidance as to the 
kind of purpose which should be regarded as charitable . From 
this list of purposes the modern concept of charities has 
evolved . Traditionally the courts have taken the approach of 
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ascertaining whether a particular purpose is sufficiently 
analogous with the preamble . More recently a more flexible 
approach has been adopted . This approach permits the court to 
c onsider if the purpose is "within the spirit and intendment" or 
"within the equity" of the statute . In this way, the connection 
with the preamble has become less and less direct. Russel L.J 
in Incorporating Council of Law Reporting tor England and 
Wales v A G2 took the view that a purpose beneficial to the 
community should be regarded as charitable unless it was a 
purpose which could not have been intended by the draftsman 
of the Elizabethan statute even if he had been aware of the 
changes which had taken place in society since 1601 . In Jn come 
Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel3 Lord 
Macnaghten summarised the charitable purposes from the 
preamble in to the f o !lowing four classes: 
1) Trusts for the re lief of poverty; 
2) Trusts for the advancement of education; 
3) Trusts for the advancement of religion; and 
4) Trusts for other purposes beneficial to the 
community not falling under any of the preceding 
heads . 
There is also one further requirement , that is that the 
purposes must be for the public benefit .4 So if a purpose falls 
within one of the four classes and is for the public benefit it 
2 
3 
4 
[1972] Ch 73 at 88 per Russel L.J 
[1891] AC 531. 
This requirement does not apply to gifts/trusts etc which are for the relief o f 
poverty, see for example Dingle v Turner [1972] AC 601 . 
6 
wi 11 be charitable ( obvious 1 y if a purpose falls within the 
fourth class it will be for the public benefit anyway) . Lord 
Macnaghten·s classification has largely superseded the 1601 
preamble although in cases under the head of purposes 
beneficial to the community" the courts still refer to the 
preamble for guidance . It is this head which has probably 
caused most problems and in which there is such a volume of 
case law. 
PART II : SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT 
DEFINITION. 
A GENERAL 
The first point to make about the so-called definition of 
charity is that it is not really a definition at all. Pemsel's four 
categories are merely a classification. The terms used are 
extreme 1 y vague and give no enunciation of a general principle 
to be used in determining what is and is not a charity. The 
fourth head "other purposes beneficial to the comminity" is 
particularly vague and is only applicable with reference to the 
preamble to the Chari tab le Uses Act 1601 and the re le van t 
cases. However in some cases it is hard to determine anything 
but a remote association with the objects in the preamble . For 
example, in Re Dupree·s Trusts 5 Vaisey J held charitable a gift 
for the promotion of an annual chess tournament for boys and 
young men in Portsmouth .The preamble itself is also not a 
definition but rather a list of objects which reflect the main 
areas of social need and concern at the time when the Act was 
5 [1945] Ch 16. 
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passed. It was described by Lord Macnaghten as "a sort of 
index or chart" .6 
One of the main difficulties with the present charity law is 
the need to find an analogy with an ancient and obsolete 
statute . The courts must have regard to what Queen Elizabeth 's 
legislators laid down 388 years ago, so it is not suprising that 
the courts have sometimes failed to adapt to changing social 
needs and circumstances. Since 1601, society and ideas have 
changed utterly Not only is the law tied down to these 
analogies but it also has no express 1 y formulated policy or 
principle to guide the court in its decision . The result has been 
a tang le of anomalies, strained analogies and general 
confusion. In many cases the decisions are based on unjustified 
rules and verbal subtleties rather than on any recognised 
principle. Many writers have suggested that a re-definition of 
charity should be sought. Foster J. said in Incorporated Council 
of Law Reporting for England and Wales v AG:7 
6 
7 
"I find it incredible that the law on this subject is still 
derived from the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth I, 
long since repealed and long since out of date, and in 
modern times applied by analogy upon analogy. It is 
time this branch of the law was reconsidered, 
rationalised and modernised ... 
B RELIGION 
Above n 3, 581. 
Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v AG (1971] Ch 626, 647. 
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The advancement of religion is now considered a charitable 
purpose, al though for historical reasons the preamble to the 
1601 statute only indirectly mentions religion by its reference 
to "the repair of churches" .s The law has now come a long way 
from the 1601 statute and is prepared to recognise as 
charitable the advancement of some strange be lief s .9 The 
analogies with the preamble are becoming increasingly 
strained. 
I Technical Inconsistencies 
The confusion in this area of the definition of charity may be 
appreciated by taking a few examples of some decisions on the 
matter. A gift in Eng land "to the Roman Catho lie Church, for 
the use thereof" has been held charitable.10 Yet a gift for 
"Roman Catho lie purposes in the parish of Coleraine and 
elsewhere" was held void for being too wide.11 A gift "To his 
Eminence the Archbishop to Westminster Cathedral London .. . 
for purposes as he shall in his abso 1 ute discretion think fit" 
was held charitable . However in Ireland a gift to the Pope to 
use and app 1 y at his so le and abso 1 ute discretion in carrying 
out sacred office" was held void .12 The judge in that case held 
that the Pope has functions which were not charitable. In 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
The historical reasons for not including religious purposes were based on the eigthteenth and nineteenth 
century attempts to establish a uniformity of religious beliefs and the desire to avoid the intervention of 
variable religions according to the pleasure of suceeding princes. The historical reasons are discussed more 
fully by Moore "Readings upon the statute 43 Elizabeth" in Duke, Law of Charitable Uses (1676) 131, 
132. 
Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beav 14. 
Re Schoales (1920] 2 Ch 7. 
Maclaughlan v Campbell [1906] 1 IR 588. 
Re Moore [1919] 1 IR 316. 
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Australia a gift for "religious uses or purposes" was held void 
because the words came after a gift for "charitable uses or 
purposes " and the judge thought the testarix had made a 
distinction . In New Zealand Re Clark 13 deals with a gift of £50 a 
year to the wife (if any) of the minister from time to time of 
the Featherston Presbyterian Church to be used by her for her 
own private use . The judge held it not charitable regarding the 
possible effect of promoting recruitment to the ministry as too 
remote . However the judge said :14 
"I confirm that I would like to uphold this particular gift 
if I could consistently with authority for ... the object is 
... a most worthy one . However , I have been forced to 
the conclusion that the gift fails ." 
This leaves one wondering what it was the judge considered 
worthy . Whether its worth was because of the advancement of 
religion or for some other purpose beneficial to the community 
it seems odd that the judge could not hold it charitable . In Re 
Touchet1s a Canadian case, the court in giving judgment on a gift 
to a bishop commented : 
13 
14 
15 
II 
"A recent author, Keeton in The Modern Law of 
Charities 1962 pg 65, has commented that this branch of 
the law of charities is suffering from over technicality . 
I join with others who have said that they do not wish 
to add to it ." 
Neutrality 
[1961] NZLR 635. 
Above n 13,642. 
(1963) 40 DLR (2d) 961. 
10 
The law makes no distinction between one sort of religion 
and another . For example trusts for the advancement of Hindu, 
Sikh, Islamic and Buddhist religions have been registered as 
charitable.16 The law also assumes that any religion is at least 
likely to be better than none.17 There are two concerns with 
this type of approach. The first concern is that charitable 
status is given to religious cu 1 ts (such as the Di vine Light 
Mission in Eng land 18) which are obscure and sometimes 
dangerous movements . Some of these religious cults have an 
inf 1 uence on their adherents which is tantamount to 
brainwashing. The difficulty seems to be that the judges are so 
concerned with not weighing up the merits of one religion with 
another that they are neglecting the fundamental question of 
...., ( \ 
public benefit. Pemsel's f:o::u:rth category is the advancement of 
religion, but that does not mean that advancement of any 
religion is charitable. The element of public benefit still has 
to be satisfied. 
The second concern about the approach the courts are taking 
is that it allows the advancement of foolish opinions to be 
granted charitable status . One ex amp le of this is the case of 
Re Watson19 where Plowman J upheld a trust for the 
publication and distribution of religious writing of no intrinsic 
worth. Thornton v Howe20 is another example . In this case a 
trust for the publication of the writings of Joanna Southcote, 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
See "Charities: A Framework For The Future" British government White Paper, presented to Parliament 
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department May 1989, 7. 
Gilmour v Coates [1949) AC 426, 457-458, per Lord Reid. 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 23 1974-75 , 387. 
[1973) I WLR 1565. 
Above n 9. 
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who claimed that she was with child by the Holy Ghost and 
would give birth to a new Messiah, was granted charitable 
status. The judge thought that Joanna·s views where decidedly 
odd but said that a religious trust would be charitable if :21 
" ... the tendency were not immoral and although this 
court might consider the op1n1ons sought to be 
propagated foolish or even devoid of foundation ." 
One wonders where the question of public benefit came into 
the judge's decision. Did he actually consider the propagation 
of foolish views devoid of foundation as being for the public 
benefit or has the insistence that the law stand neutral as 
between religions led to a situation where the public benefit 
element is no longer so significant? The judge did of course 
point out that the religious ten en ts must not be immoral if the 
trust is to be charitable, but it is wrong to assume that merely 
because a trust is not immoral that it is necessarily for the 
public benefit . 
It has been suggested that these problems would be solved if 
charitable status were removed from al 1 trusts which are 
established to advance religion .22 This seems both unnecessary 
and undesirable. Many religious organisations are clearly 
regarded as charitable by both the layperson and the law. A 
more sensible approach would be to reaffirm the public benefit 
element as the basis of charitable status . This approach is 
disscussed more fully in the final part of this paper which 
21 
22 
Above n 9, 19 
Above n 16, 8 where the White Paper discusses the possibility of excluding religious organisations from 
the definition of charity but concludes that this would be undesirable. 
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deals with the redefinition of charity . If this approach were 
adopted, dangerous religious cu 1 ts and the advancement of 
foolish opinions devoid of foundation would not be granted 
charitable status. 
There is a further concern about the claim that the law is 
neutral as between religions. This concern is not that a 
neutral approach wi 11 allow too many religions to be granted 
charitable status but rather that the claim of neutrality is a 
false claim . Michael Blakeney expresses this opinion in his 
article "Sequestered Piety and Charity A Comparitive 
Analysis."23 He argues that contrary to its avowed policy of 
even-handedness, the law relating to charities exhibits a 
Protestant bias . What the argument amounts to is that there is 
a Protestant bias in requiring a charity to be proved to be for 
the pub lie benefit . The article, however, fails to exp lain what 
it is that is charitable about a trust which is not for the pub lie 
benefit and why such a trust should be encouraged . It may be 
that the modern concept of charity is a Protestant concept 
because it has public benefit as its essence. If this is the case 
it is the meaning of the word and not the bias of the courts 
which leads to the requirement of public benefit. 
III Humanism 
It has been suggested that humanism and possi b 1 y other 
athiest and agnostic philosophies should be upheld as 
charitable trusts.24 It would be hard to fit these into Pemsel's 
23 
24 
(1981) 2 Journal of Legal History, 207. 
See Scott Trusts (3rd ed) para 377; Goodman Report (1976) 23 para 53. 
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"advancement of religion" category . If religion means a system 
of faith then perhaps it can be argued that humanism is a 
religion, because it involves faith in the importance of common 
human needs and an abstention from profitless theorizing. 
However if, as is more likely, religion means the human 
recognition of superhuman controlling powers and especially 
of a God, then humanism does not qualify as a religion . 
Humanism is the belief in man as a responsbile and 
progressive intellectual being. It specifically rejects the be lief 
in a God of any kind. In Re South Place Ethical Society2s the 
view that a system of belief which did not involve faith in a 
diety could constitute a religion was rejected . However the 
position of Buddhism was deliberately left open . Buddhism is 
generally accepted by society as being a religion but it may not 
involve a belief in God . 
There is also the possibility of classifying humanism as 
charitable under the fourth head in Pemsel's case; ie "other 
purposes beneficial to the community". The problem with this 
is that the category is still tied down to analogies with the 
1601 preamble. There is no mention of humanism or any such 
related thing in the preamble. However, some of the analogies 
in present day cases are so remote that this may not pose a 
problem, and in any case it is arguable that the law of charities 
should not be tied down to such an ancient and obsolete Act. 
Another di ff i c u 1 t y is that the courts are u n like 1 y to consider 
humanism as being for the public benefit. In Bowman26 Lord 
Parker seems to suggest that a trust for a society with 
25 
26 
(1980] 1 WLR 1565. 
(1917] AC 406. 
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humanist objects would not be charitable . H Picarda in his 
textbook21 "The Law and Practice Relating to Chari ties" 
expresses the opinion that humanism should not be granted 
charitable status. His first reason for saying this, is that 
humanism is adverse to the very foundation of religion so 
cannot be for the public benefit . In an age where intellectual 
freedom is valued it seems odd to dismiss all possibility of 
humanism being for the pub lie benefit just because it in vo 1 ves 
a belief system with no God. The principle of giving to others 
can be just as strong in a humanist trust as in a religious trust . 
Some humanist trusts involve principles which promote the 
highest social, moral and domestic standards .The pub lie 
benefit in such a trust would seem a lot clearer than the public 
benefit in propagating foolish views devoid of foundation . 
The second reason that Picarda puts forward for denying 
humanist trust charitable status to humanist trusts is based on 
his be lief that such a trust would be po 1i tic al. Objections to 
denial of charitable status on such grounds are discussed in 
section of this paper which deals with po 1i tic al activity. 
The presumption is that any religion is better than none, but 
at times the law seems to have lost track of why this is so . 
The reason religion is usually charitable is because it is part 
of the ethics of most religions to encourage man to want to 
give. Religion can therefore be a fundamental source of 
charity and advancement of religion is certainly for the public 
27 Hubert Picarda The Law and Practice relating to Charities (1977), 57. 
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benefit. 28 What needs to be asked more, is not whether a 
particular organisation is religious but whether it is for the 
pub lie benefit regard less of whether one may like to labe 1 it as 
a religion or not . The inconsistencies, and difficulties then 
become managable because they are contained within a 
general principle rather than a mass of confusing decisions . 
C SPORT AND RECREATION 
The legal definition of charity in relation to sport and 
recreation provides yet another example for the law·s antique 
and unsatisfactory qualities in relation to the definition of 
charity . 
I Mere Sport 
Since 1895, it has been accepted that a trust for the 
encouragement of sport or games does not fall within the 
boundaries of a legal charity. This was made clear in Re 
Nottage29 where Lindley, in considering a gift to provide an 
annual prize for yacht racing, stated :3° 
28 
"Now I should say that every healthy sport is good for 
the nation - cricket, football, fencing, yachting or any 
other healthy exercise or recreation, but if it had been 
the idea of lawyers that a gift for the encouragement of 
such exercises is therefore charitable, we should have 
heard of it before now." 
c.f Gilmour v Coates [ 1949] AC 426 where a religious trust did not involve advancement of religion. The 
case involved a gift to a closed religious order of purely contemplative nuns and was held not to be charitable. 
29 [1895] 2 Ch 649,655 . 
30 Above n 29, 655. 
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And he added for good measure "I deal with the present case 
on the broad ground that I am not aware of any authority 
pointing to the conclusion that a gift for the encouragement of 
a mere sport can be supported as charitable " .31 Similar 1 y the 
promotion of angling, 32 fox hunting, 33 swimming and ahtletics 34 
have been held not to be charitable objects . 
There are however exceptions made to this general rule . A 
gift made to encourage sport is charitible if made to the army 3s 
or as an adjunct to religion .36 The most important exception is 
if the promotion can be shown to be not an end in itself, but is 
part of some wider educational purpose . Then the trust will be 
charitible . So, in Re Mariette31 Eve J decided that a gift of 
£10,000 to provide squash courts for Aldenham School was 
charitable. He commented that "no-one .. . can be properly 
educated unless at least as much attention is given to the 
development of his body as is given to the development of his 
mind ."3s 
The question arises as to why sporting and recreational 
organisations are large 1 y denied charitable status . There 
really does not seem to be any difference between promoting 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Above n 29, 656. 
Re Clifford [1912] 1 Ch 29. 
Re Thompson [1934] Ch 342. 
Laing v Commission of Stamp Duties [1948] NZLR 154. 
Re Gran [1925] 2 Ch 362. 
Commissioner of Valuation for Northern Ireland v Trustees of Fisherwick Presbyterian Church [1972] 2 
Ch 284. 
37 
38 
[1915] 2 Ch 284. 
Above n 37, 288 . 
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for ex amp le, football, through a schoo 1, university , religious 
organisation or the army and promoting it by some other 
means . What should be important is the end not the means, the 
substance and not the form. One wonders why some of these 
t rusts could not fall under the fourth head of charity (other 
purposes beneficial to the community) . Of course, as with all 
legal charities, the object of the trust must be within the spirit 
and in tendmen t of the preamble to the 1601 Act . It is not 
unreasonable to suppose that sport could have been a purpose 
in tended by the draftsman of the Elizabethan Statute , if he had 
been aware of the changes which have taken place in society 
since 1601. In any case, the courts have already in many cases 
stretched the connections with the 1601 Act . Furthermore as 
has already been pointed out, tying the definition of charity to 
an ancient and obsolete statute seems a pointless requirement . 
For a trust to succeed it must be for the public benefit . This 
does not seem particular 1 y hard to satisfy with many sporting 
trusts . Of course if a sporting trust is particular 1 y frivolous or 
dangerous then it will naturally not be charitable . However, on 
the who 1 e, sport and fitness are high 1 y des i r a b 1 e objects . As 
Picarda points out in an article on sporting charity :39 
39 
" ... dieticians, medical opinion and g lamourous 
Hollywood women of a certain age are all agreed that 
sensible physical exercise is the key to health and 
happiness. 'A healthy mind in a healthy body· as a 
maxim is now accepted not only by the independent 
sector in education but by people from all walks of life . 
The fact that some fitness fanatics are incidental 1 y 
Hubert Picarda "Sporting Charity" (1988) supplement number 52 New Law Journal - Annual Charities 
Review iv. 
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deviants proves nothing. Physical recreation is in 
general a thoroughly good thing." 
What is even more significant in regard to the question of 
pub lie benefit is that the cases themse 1 ves actually admit that 
sporting trusts can be for the public benefit . Lindley L J in Re 
Nottage acknowledged that "every healthy sport is good for the 
nation" 40 and Lord Wright in National Anti-vivisection Society v 
JRC 4ladmitted that "healthy and manly sports are certainly, in 
f act, beneficial to the community ... .. 
Society is increasingly concerned to extend and increase the 
use and improvement of recreational and sporting 
opportunities . The law of charities has failed to reflect these 
changes in society's views and needs . 
II Recreational facilities 
In IRC v Baddeley42 the House of Lords threw considerable 
doubt on whether recreational faci 1i ties could ever be 
charitable, if the education, poverty, or incapacity of the 
beneficiaries is not the prime consideration of the donor. The 
outcome of the Baddeley case in England was the Recreational 
Chari ties Act 1958. The legislation was substantially copied in 
New Zealand in the Chari tab le Amendment Act 1963 which 
40 
41 
42 
Above n 29, 655. 
[1948] AC 31 , 42. 
[1955] AC 572. 
inserted s61A into the Charitable Trusts Act 1957.43 
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Both 
that jurisdictions confirmed the long-time supposition 
comm unity centres and village halls for the pub lie at large, or 
sizeable sections of the public do have a charitable character. 
The legislation provides that it shall be and be deemed always 
to have been, charitable to provide facilities for recreation or 
other leisure-time occupations, if the facilities are provided in 
the "interests of social welfare." 
The English courts have unfortunately taken a restrictive 
approach to the legislation. As Alan Hutchinson commented in 
an article on this topic; .. the energies of reform, at hand in 
bringing about the 1958 Act, have been effectively dissipated 
by judicial timidity and reticence".44 The matter hinges around 
the words "social welfare". The 1958 Act states that for the 
requirement of "social welfare" to be met the facilities must be 
provided with the purpose of improving the conditions of life 
for the persons for whom the facilities are primarily intended 
and either: 
43 
1 Those persons have need of such facilities by reason of 
their youth, age, infirmity, disablement, poverty, race, 
occupation, or social and economic circumstances; or 
2 The facilities are to be available to the members or 
female members of the public at large. 
See Morgan v Wellington City Council [1975) I NZLR 416 where the court had to consider a gift of land 
upon trust for the purposes of public recreation and enjoyment to a city corporation for the benefit of the citizens 
of Wellington city. The court held this trust to be charitable under section 61A of the Charitable Uses Act 1957. 
44 Alan Hutchinson "Recreational Charities - A Change of Tactics Required?" (1978) Conveyancer 355, 360. 
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The timidity of the courts can be seen by the interpretation, 
that the court gives to these provisions in Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v McMullen .45 Here the court had to consider a 
trust set up by the Football Association to provide facilities 
which would enable and encourage pupils at schools and 
universities in any part of the United Kingdom to play football 
or other games or sports and so ensure that due attention was 
given to the physical education and development of such pupils 
as we 11 as to the development and occupation of their minds . 
It was held by the majority of the Court of Appeal that the trust 
was not charitable .46 It was held that "social welfare" indicated 
some kind of deprivation which needed to be alleviated and 
since the pupils were not deprived, the trust did not satisfy the 
requirements of the Act. Such arguments are difficult to accept 
since the Act itself states that the "youth" of the persons for 
whom the facilities are primarily intended constitutes a 
sufficient social need. Hutchinson right 1 y points out that the 
reasoning of the court can on 1 y render the Act use less and 
impotent. 47 
The more important point in regard to the English and New 
Zealand statutes is that they have merely drawn attention to 
one small difficulty in the legal definition of charity. They 
mere 1 y aim to set to rights some of the implications of an 
unfortunate decision . They are examples of a patchwork 
approach to the problem of the legal definition of charity 
45 
46 
47 
[1979] l WLR 130 
The Court of Appeal's decision was reversed by the House of Lords on other grounds with the consequence 
that the effect of the Recreational Charities Act 1958 was not in issue. See [1981] AC 1. 
Above n 44, 361 
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rather than an approach aimed at effecting some real measure 
of reform. 
D POLITICS 
One of the rules which judges have developed in respect of 
the definition of charities is that political purposes are not 
charitable. The rule is a blanket one ,48 and no inquiry is 
permitted into whether the purpose falls within the spirit and 
intendment of the preamble to the Charitable Uses Act nor is 
an inqury permitted into the benefits which the activity may 
bestow on the public. Political activity is simply made the 
basis for refusing charitable status . The problem with this 
feature of the legal definition is that none of the reasons given 
for this blanket rule adequately justifies its existence. In all 
other areas of charity law the same tests are applied; i.e 
consideration is given to the preamble and to questions of 
public benefit. Regardless of any consideration into whether 
these tests need clarifying or improving, the fact sti 11 remains 
that no good reason has been given for treating political 
purposes any different 1 y from other purposes in charity law. It 
has been said that the courts have arbi tari 1 y invented a non-
existent law.49 This section of the paper examines some of the 
cases on this rule and the reasons given for the rule. 
Consideration is given as to whether these reasons justify the 
exclusion of all political purposes from the definition of 
charity. 
48 
49 
The only exception to the rule, is if the political purposes are ancillary to some other charitable purpose. 
The limits and difficulties to this exception are discussed later in this section. 
See the English Charity Law Reform Commitee paper "Charity Law - Only a new start will do" (1975) 
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I Some of the cases 
Political parties 
Many cases have held that groups which have the purpose of 
supporting a po 1i tical party are not charitable . In Re 
Hopkinsonso a trust to advance adult education on the lines of 
the Labour Party's memorandum "A Note on Education in the 
Labour Party" was held to be political and therefore not 
charitable. In Re Bushnells1 a trust for "the advancement and 
propagation of the teaching of socialised medicine" was held to 
be political and therefore not charitable . In Australia a gift for 
the Communist Party of Australia for its so le use and benefit 
was held to be void because its purposes were not charitable .s2 
Peace and international understanding 
In Ang lo-Swedish Society v IR Comrss3 the promotion of 
closer and more sympathetic understanding between English 
and Swedish peoples was held to be not charitable because "it 
was a trust to promote an attitude of mind, a view of one 
nation by another." In Buxton v Public Trusteess4 a trust to 
promote the improvement of international relations and 
intercourse was held not charitable. More recen t1 y however, in 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
[1949] 1 All ER 346. 
[1975] 1 All ER 721. 
Bacon v Pianta [1966] ALR 1044. 
(1931) 47 TLR 295. 
[1962], 41 TC 235. 
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Re Koeppler 55it was held that a gift to fund a series of 
academic conferences for members of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development who were influential 
i n social, po 1i tic al and economic matters in their own countries 
was held charitable . The purpose was for promotion of greater 
co-operation in Europe and the West . It was held that the trust 
was educational in character and for the public benefit and 
t hat political matters could be touched on at the conferences 
without affecting its charitable status . 
Changes in the law 
Another group of cases involves organisations whose object 
i s to change the existing law. In the National Anti-Vivisection 
Society56 case the House of Lords held the anti-vivisection 
society not charitable on two grounds. First, vivisection was for 
t he public benefit therefore to abolish it was not. Secondly, a 
main object of the society was the repeal of the Cruelty to 
Animals Act 1876 and the substitution of a new enactment 
prohibiting vivisection altogether . This main object was 
political and therefore the society was held political and not 
charitable. Lord Porter dissented from this cone 1 usion. In his 
view an object was on 1 y po 1i tical if it necessitated a change in 
law; if the desired purpose could be achieved by persuasion 
and not by a change of law , then it was not po 1i tical. 
55 
56 
Changes in the law of foreign countries 
[1985] 2 All ER 869. 
[1948] AC 31. LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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As an extension of the above category, it was held in 
M cGovern v Attorney Generals1 that a trust whose object is to 
secure alteration in the laws of a foreign country will fail 
because of its politic al nature . Similar 1 y Amnesty International 
h as been denied charitable status . 
Opposing a change in the law 
In Molloy v Commissioner of Inland Revenuess the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal had to consider a gift made to the New 
Zealand Society for the Protection of the Un born Child (SPUC) . 
T he SPUC were advocating the maintenance of abortions laws 
w hich the Abortion Law Reform Association were attempting to 
liberalise . This is the first case where the advocacy of 
m aintenance of the law was at issue as compared to advocacy 
o f a change in law. The court regarded the former just as 
p olitical as the latter and the gift was according 1 y held to be 
n on charitable . 
II Political purposes which are ancillary to main purposes 
In most of the cases the rule that politic al purposes are not 
charitable has been applied so that if a group is in vo 1 ved in 
any political activities it is not granted charitable status. The 
courts have usually been very re 1 uctan t to be seen to endorse 
any political purpose . However the case Re Koeppler 
59shows 
an approach which looks at the dominant purpose to determine 
57 
58 
59 
[1982] Ch 321. 
[1981] NZLR 688. 
Above n 55. 
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whether the group is charitable . In 
this case the political 
purposes were seen as mere 1 y anci
llary to the dominant 
pu rpose which was considered by the 
court to be educational 
and therefore charitable . This approac
h is commonly taken by 
th e courts in the United States . 60 Lord N
ormand and Lord Porter 
in the National Anti-Vivisection Society
61 case also recognised 
th at the existence of some political m
otive is not necessarily 
fatal . 
This approach leads to inconsistencies
 in the cases because 
o f the difficulty in determining what th
e dominant purpose and 
w hat the ancillary purpose of a particu
lar group is . I n many of 
t he cases where the court has held a 
trust to be political and 
therefore non-charitable it could be
 argued that political 
purposes were actually ancillary to
 some other dominant 
purposes. For example, in the Anti-Viv
isection Society case 
t he main purpose could be seen as p
revention of cruelty to 
animals and in Molloy the main purpos
e could be seen as the 
prevention of abortion. In both these
 cases the purpose of 
seeking maintenance or alteration of 
the law could be argued 
to be ancillary to these main purposes
, because it is merely a 
means of achieving an end. The distin
ction between ancillary 
and dominant purposes has caused con
siderable difficulties for 
charities in vo 1 ved in re lief of poverty 
abroad . They have not 
been content to limit their activities
 to alleviating poverty 
direct 1 y, believing that more could be
 achieved by attacking 
the underlying causes of poverty whic
h may lie in the social 
structure of the countries concerned o
r in the policies of their 
60 
61 
See for example Vanderbilt v Commissioner of Inte
rnal Revenue(l 937) 93F 2d 560. 
Above n 41, 55, 76. 
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governments .62 In doing this they have often endangered their 
charitable status . 
III Reasons given for political purposes not being 
charitable 
Propaganda 
One reason for the courts denying political purposes 
charitable status is that it is not for the public benefit to have 
pressure groups , propaganda campaigns , lobbying and the 
supply of distorted information which make independent 
judgment difficult .63 There are two problems with this 
reasoning . First there is a fine line between propaganda and 
education . Sheridan put it this way :64 
"There is a thin line, difficult to discern and possibly 
without great legal significance, but there all the same, 
between trying to convert people to a point of view and 
informing them of its existence and of the reasons for 
it; between propaganda and education ." 
The second problem with this reason is that it does not 
justify the denial of charitable status to all po 1i tical activities. 
Not all political activities involve corrupt lobbying and the 
supp 1 y of distorted information. It may be charitable to 
advocate change in the law by putting forward suggestions on 
the basis of reasoned argument, but not charitable to put one ·s 
62 
63 
64 
Elizabeth Cairns makes Lhis point in her book; Charities : Law and Practice, 22. 
Above n 50. 
Sheridan "The Political Muddle - A Charit.able View?" (1 977) 19 Mai LR 42, 70. 
27 
viewpoint forward by resorting to coercive techniques such as 
threats and bribes. The question should still be asked in 
respect of each particular case whether there is any benefit to 
the public. 
The court should expound laws as they stand 
Another reason given for political purposes not being 
charitable is that the court on deciding whether a trust is 
charitable must decide on the principle that the law is right as 
it stands, since to do otherwise would usurp the functions of 
the legislature.6s This reason is not very convincing when one 
considers that judges themselves change the law from time to 
time in their departing from precedents and in distinguishing 
and overruling decided cases . According to Rickett; "the whole 
essence of the common law is that judges participate over and 
are engaged in the development of the law by change ."66 Lord 
Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson 61 was breaking new ground, if 
judges did not make such decisions and never took any notice 
of changing social conditions it would result in the 
stultification of the laW.68 This reason does not, therefore, 
seem adequate as a basis for denying charitable status to 
po 1i tical trusts. 
65 
66 
67 
68 
No sufficient means of judging public benefit 
Above 2,336 and see Tyssen on Charitable Bequests (1898 ed al 176). 
Charles Rickeu, "Charity and Politics" (1982), 10 New Zealand Universities Law Review, 169, 172. 
[19231 AC 601 
See further LA Sheridan "Charity versus Politics", (1973), 2 Anglo-American Law Review, 47, 57. 
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A further reason the courts have given for political purposes 
not being charitable is given by Lord Parker in Bowman69 and 
applied in the An ti-Vivisection 70 case and in McGovern 71 , Lord 
Parker said : " ... the court has no means of judging whether a 
proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public 
benefit ... ". 72 This is a strain on erect u li ty . In all other areas of 
charity law judges must make a decision on the question of 
public benefit,73 why should political trusts be any different? 
The law arbitrarily discriminates against many worthwhile 
enterprises only because of the alleged difficulties in judging 
public benefit . Public benefit is often a difficult question to 
decide but the court should have a duty to consider the 
question on the evidence available . Nobles suggests that the 
rule against political purposes being charitable is mere 1 y a 
formula for allowing the courts to avoid adjudicating on issues 
regarded as controversial or po li tical.74 
The argument becomes even less convincing in light of the 
fact that in some of the cases involving political purposes, the 
courts do in fact make a judgement on public benefit. In the 
Anti-Vivisection case the court did clearly make a judgment 
that vivisection was for the public benefit. In Molloy Somers J 
cone 1 uded that the pub lie good in restricting abortion was not 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
Above n 26, 4. 
Above n 41. 
Above n 57. 
Above n 26, 4. 
Harvey Cohen makes this point in "Charities - A Utilitarian Perspective" (1983) Current Legal Problems, 
241, 255 . He points out that this is particularly so in the fourth class of Lord Macnaghten 's classification. 
R Nobles "Politics, Public benefit and Charities" (1982) Modern Law Review, 704, 707. 
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so se 1f evident as to achieve such charitable pre-requisite. 75 
He seems to be making the kind of judgmen t that Lord Parker 
claims is impossible to make . 
In respect of some issues it is hard to believe that the court 
has no means of judging the public benefit . For example 
promotion of a change in laws which permit slavery or torture 
or cruelty to animals can surely be classed as within the spirit 
of the preamble to the Charitable Uses Act and as being for the 
public benefit . It is obviously more difficult when the issue is 
a more controversial one , for example issues such as abortion 
or fluoridation of water . However in these cases too, the court 
should have a duty to decide the question of pub lie benefit, and 
this includes considering the benefit gained from the fostering 
of pub lie debate about important issues in society . As Rickett 
rhetorically asks in relation to the Molloy case : 76 
"Is there not some considerable pub lie interest in 
fostering a full and committed debate on the issue of 
abortion? Is there not some considerable pub lie 
interest in fostering any interest that people take in the 
law and its content?" 
Public debate provides an opportunity for an exchange of 
ideas and it keeps governmental authorities abreast of the 
varied and complex issues coming before them . There is 
however a danger that in some cases only one viewpoint would 
75 
76 
Above n 58, 697 . 
Above n 66, 171 also the same point is made by R B M Cotterrell in "Charity and Politics" (1975) 
Modern Law Review , 471, 474. 
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be aired pub lie 1 y . 77 However this does not mean that the 
privileges of being a charity would be operating to favour one 
side in a controversy . The pub lie benefit would exist as long 
as both sides of the debate had the opportunity to be aired 
publicly. 
Political Impartiality 
One reason for denying political activities charitable status, 
which is often referred to in cases involving promotion of a 
particular political party, is that judges do not want to 
prejudice their reputation for political impartiality .n They do 
not want to be seen to be getting involved in any way in the 
workings of the political system . This however is not a reason 
for charity and politics being incompatible but rather a reason 
for why judges do not want to be involved in the task of 
selecting those political purposes which are compatible with 
charitable principles and rejecting those which are not. In 
actual fact the court need not make a decision on the worth of 
the particular po 1i tical cause if it decides that the pub lie 
benefit derives from the public debate on controversial issues. 
In any case, judges do make po 1i tical, moral and social 
judgments in many of the cases they decide in other areas of 
law. 
The cases do not give satisfactory reasons for the rule that 
po 1i tical purposes are not charitable. There is a distinct 
77 This point was made by Elias clark in his article "The Limitation on Political Acitivities: A Discordant 
Nole InThe Law of Charities" (1960) Virginia Law Review 439,458. 
78 Above n 53, 237. 
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judicial reluctance to analyse the policy issues underlying the 
rule. The rule at present is basically a blanket approach 
against political purposes. It is an excuse given by the courts 
so that they can a void dealing with po 1i tic al matters. 
Charities with political involvement are often motivated by a 
desire to serve mankind. No adequate reason has been given as 
to why they should be denied privileges which are given to 
religion, the arts and education which also seek to serve 
mankind in differing ways. As Clark points out the on 1 y 
difference is that the former aims its message directly to 
government which often leads to the most immediate solution 
to society's problems.19 Real change in the world is highly 
political and as Susan Bright comments in her article "Charity 
and Trusts for the pub lie Benefit - Time for a Rethink" :80 
"They [the Charity Commissioners] state, for ex amp le, that 
charities must a void "seeking to eliminate social, economic, 
political or other injustice" surely this is the essence of what 
most people would regard as charitable activity!" 
Regard less of whether the present tests in respect of the 
legal definition of charity should be improved or not, it is 
desirable to apply a definition to every case on its facts. It 
may be that by this process, many political purposes will fail, 
but they should only fail after all the evidence in each 
situation is looked at and considered in the light of the 
definition of charity. As the present definition of charity 
Above n 77, 452. 79 
80 Susan Bright "Charity and Trusts for the Public Benefit - Time For a Rethink" (1989) The Conveyancer, 
28, 32. 
32 
stands, adequate justification has not been given for the denial 
of charitable status to po 1i tical purposes. 
Judges do not want to deal with political matters . This is 
probably because they fear that it will result in prejudice to 
their much hallowed impartiality. If judges are so unwilling to 
consider issues of charity and polities then perhaps the law 
ought to allow a different body of persons to make these 
judgments . 
E EDUCATION 
The advancement of education has always been considered 
to be charitable in the legal sense . The 1601 preamble refers 
to "the maintenance of schools ... and scho tars in universities" 
and "the education and preferment of orphans" . The scope of 
educational activities upheld as charitable has been extended 
we 11 beyond these purposes. For ex amp le research and 
information services, which are considered to be for the public 
benefit, are held charitable under the head of education.s1 Yet 
again the analogies with the 1601 statue have been stretched 
further and further, which makes one wonder why the 1601 
preamble is retained as part of the law of charity . 
The main problems with this area of the definition appear to 
be on the fringes of the de fin it ion of education and have 
large 1 y been dealt with in the sections on sport and po 1i ties. 
For example why is a set of squash courts educational if it is 
given to a school but not educational if given another section 
81 Re Hopkins Will Trust [1965] Ch 669. 
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of the community? and why is a trust which aims to inform 
people about socialised medicine not considered education? 
In the area of sport it has been argued that trusts to 
e ncourage the physical education and development of schoo 1 
p upils are educational and thus charitable . In Re Mariette 82 the 
court upheld a gift of this nature as charitable . The gift was 
£10 ,000 to provide squash courts for a particular school and 
t he c ourt considered this promotion of physical development 
a s an educational purpose in just the same way that promoting 
d evelopment of the mind would be . However i n t he more 
recent case Inland Revenue Commissioners v McMullen 83 the 
majority held a trust to promote physical education and 
development by enabling and encouraging pupils at schools 
and universities in any part of the United I<ingdom to play 
Football or other games or sports, as non-charitable . The 
majority interpreted the purposes of the trust as connoting the 
promotion of something which a young man acquires when 
playing such games as association football and that whatever 
that something may mean it has nothing whatever to do with 
education. Re Mariette was distinguished on the grounds that 
it involved a gift to an institution which was a school and so 
could be enjoyed as part of the curricu 1 um of that schoo 1 and 
was therefore educational because it was for the purpose of 
the schoo 1. But this did not seem to be the emphasis in Re 
Mariette at all. In fact the reasoning in Re Mariette could well 
be applied to the facts of McMullen and lead to the conclusion 
that the trust was to ensure that as much attention is given to 
82 [19 15] 2 Ch 284. 
83 { 1979} WLR 130. 
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the development of pupils' bodies as is given to the 
devlopment of their minds and this seems to be why Eve J held 
t he gift of squash courts to a schoo 1 as charitable . In 
McMullen Bridge L J , the dissenting judge, took this view. He 
argued that organised sporting activities play an important part 
i n the overall education process . Therefore , since the purpose 
of this trust is to promote physical education and development 
so as to ensure that the physical side of education is not 
neglected, and the beneficiaries are all persons engaged in any 
formal education process , then the trust is clearly for an 
e ducational purpose . The approach of Bridge L J seems to be 
greatly preferable . 
The problem in this area of charity law, seems to be that the 
arguments are al 1 about the meaning of the word education . 
What really needs to be done is to step back and ask whether 
the trust is "charitable" even if it is not educational. The only 
option under the present definition of charity would be to 
consider the trust under the fourth head of Pemsels case; ie; 
"purposes beneficial to the community" . But this fourth head is 
limited by the need to find an analogy with the 1601 preamble . 
And no general principle has been developed which explains 
why an analogy needs to be found and what it is that all the 
analogies will then have in common . There is no explanation 
of any common thread, no single principle one can refer to to 
decide whether a particular purpose should qualify as 
charitable . So the court is left to debate endlessly about what 
is and what is not educational and in doing so are probab 1 y 
subconsciously or otherwise doing so on the basis of their 
notion of what they consider charitable . Some judges probably 
35 
prefer it this way, and feel more secure if they are able keep 
within the limits of the preamble, using it as a kind of 
safeguard . 
F ANIMALS 
Trusts for the relief of animals in distress and for the 
suppression of crue 1 ty to animals are charitable . 8 4 This is 
because of the usefulness of animals to mankind (in the case 
of domestic animals) and because it is good for mankind to be 
taught not to be c rue 1 but to be kind to an i ma 1 s . 85 
It is difficult to understand then why a trust for the 
suppression of cruelty to animals which are human is not also 
charitable. 86 This benefit to mankind is the cu 1 ti vation of the 
finer side of man's nature by discouraging his innate tendency 
to cruelty. There seems to be no logical distinction between 
cruelty to animals and cruelty to other humans. 
PART IV POSSIBLE NEW APPROACHES 
A THE PATCHWORK APPROACH 
Although wholesale redefinition of charity has not yet been 
attempted, there have been some attempts to resolve 
84 
85 
86 
See for example Re Wedgewood [1915] 1 Ch 113. 
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See Above n 57 and also the Charity Commissioners report 1978 23 - 24 para 69 where the Commissioners 
conseder the Amnesty International Trust. 
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difficu 1 ties in particular areas . For ex amp le the Recreational 
Charities Act 1958 attempted to put to rights the implications 
of the Baddeley case . At first glance it appears that the White 
Paper on charity legislation, recent 1 y prod ucded by the British 
government, is recommending a patchwork approach to the 
problem of the legal definition of charity 87 . It is decided in the 
White Paper that it might be desirable to make one or two 
minor adjustments to the present law88 in the areas of religion 
and political activities . Yet after considering some of the 
problems in these areas the White Paper actually came to the 
c onclusion that it would not be wise to attempt any changes in 
the law here after all. 89 The problem with a patchwork 
approach is that it mere 1 y so 1 ves a particular symptom of a 
wider problem . It fails to effect any real measure of reform . 
The very fact that there if a perceived need to patch up the 
cracks and fissures which are appearimg in the present law 
suggests thet there is a deeper problem with the who le 
definition of charity . 
B REDE FI NITIO N 
I Is it a good idea? 
For many years now it has been debated whether the 
definition of charity should be reformulated . 
sections of this paper illustrate clearly 
The preceding 
that the legal 
definition of charity is a mess. It is tied to an ancient statute, 
87 
88 
89 
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it is complex and tangled and is fraught with decisions which 
are illogical and capricious. However, some writers still claim 
redefinition is unnecessary . Sheridan is unconvinced that 
redefinition is the answer . Professor l<eeton 90, Sheridan9 1 and 
Bentham92 are of the opinion that there is little comfort to be 
spared from developing a new definition of charity . They 
argue that we should rely on the social acumen of judges . 
Although they admit that some periodic statement, preferably 
by the House of Lords, of broad general principles, upon which 
cases will in the future be decided, might well be of assistance . 
But relying on judicial valour to develop the law of charities 
pragmaticaly against the background of contemporary need has 
so far been a f ai 1 ure, as JC Brady points out :93 
"Judicial pragmatism in our legal system has always 
been strongly tempered by judicial timidity an 
conservatism, and this has been demonstrably so in the 
development of our law of charity". 
And as N Ben twich said "We cannot expect judicial 
interpretation to unravel the judicial knots". 94 
The recent British White Paper deals in part with the issue 
of redefinition. The Paper cone 1 udes that redefinition is 
fraught with d if f i c u 1 t y and might put at risk the f 1 ex i bi 1i t y of 
90 
91 
92 
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the present law. It is incredible that the White Paper can come 
t o this conclusion after admitting that the law's development in 
this area is;95 "not always tidy and can sometimes be confusing 
even to experts, "and then going on to say : 
"It is perhaps not suprising that, as the threads reaching 
employ become more extended, so the rational for decisions on 
charitable status should not always be immediately apparent . 
This has undoubtedly led to a degree of uncertainty about the 
intepretation of the law which can inhibit innovative bodies from 
seeking charitable status ." 
One wonders how the White Paper can acknowledge such 
major defects and then decide that there are no advantages in 
attempting to redefine charity . It is not satisfactory to be 
critical of the present state of the law and then neglect the 
problem of reforming it . This is a defeatist attitude . 
Numerous writers do however feel there is a clear need to 
redefine charity . As long ago as 1957 Bentwich considered the 
clearest and simplest remedy for the evil of litigation on 
charity would be for Parliament to enact a modern definition of 
charity .96 In 1953 Fridman97 expressed the same views and 
submitted some suggestions for redefinition. In 1975 a paper 
published by the Charity Law Reform Committee entitled 
"Charity Law - Only a new start will do"9 8 The Committee 
expresses the view that the law is plainly unsatisfactory and 
95 
96 
97 
98 
Above n 16, 6. 
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that an en tire 1 y new approach is needed. Brad y99 is also in 
favour of redefinition and regards those who are critical of a 
new definition as counsel of despair . Judges too have 
frequently commented on the lack of logic and consistency in 
the case law.100 
The legal definition of charity is clearly not satisfactory and 
it is time for a new definition to be sought . 
II What should the new definition be? 
The need for reform of the definition of charity seems clear . 
It is in defining the manner of such reform that difficulty i s 
encountered . It could be argued that since it seems impossible 
to define satisfactorily what organisations are charitable that 
it would be easier and fairer if no organisations at all were 
granted charitiable status.101 This solution would however, not 
find favour with most of the public and the government who 
want to encourage charities. Under this approach even the 
most plainly beneficial and charitable causes would receive no 
encouragement. The solution is a defeatist one . 
The White Paper discusses three possible approaches for 
reformulating the definition of charity .102 It rejects them al 1. 
The first approach discussed is to define charity by listing in a 
statute the purposes which are deemed to be charitable . In a 
sense the law already has a list of purposes which are deemed 
99 
100 
101 
102 
Above n 93, 215. 
See for example above n 7. 
See above n 16 where this idea is discussed and rejected. 
Above n 16, 7. 
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charitable from Pemsel's case . This list, however, is judicially 
created rather than in statute form . It is also likely that the 
White Paper is referring to the enactment of a more detailed 
a nd specific list of purposes than Pemsel's categorisation, 
especially since the White Paper considers the enactment of 
P emsel's categories as a separate approach for redefinition . 
T he advantages of such an approach (not mentioned in the 
White Paper) are that the law would no longer be vague and 
u ncertain and value judgments would no longer need to be 
m ade . Some of the disadvantages are outlined in the White 
P aper . Firstly, it would be extremely difficult to draw up a list 
w hich could command a reasonable measure of agreement . 
However, this could be said of all attempts to define charity . 
I n the case of a list, the disagreements wi 11 be based around 
what should be included in this list . If, for example, a 
definition were based around public benefit, the disagreement 
would be about what satisfies the requirement of pub lie 
benefit. A second disadvantage that the White Paper refers to 
is that a list would be inflexible and quickly outdated by 
changing opinion . This a fair criticism and although the law 
could be kept up to date by amendment by Parliament, this 
would be highly impractical. The main criticism of the "list" 
approach is not mentioned at all by the White Paper. This is 
that the "list" approach fails to address the crucial question . 
Why are the purposes on the list deemed charitable? In other 
words the approach does not bring one any closer to 
e 1 ucidating the general principle which determines what is 
charitable and what is not . The real effect of a list approach 
i s that Parliament would be making the value judgments as to 
what was charitable. The principles upon which these 
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judgments would be made would be unknown, moreover if there 
was some general principle upon which Parliament was 
deciding which purposes were to be included on the list, there 
w ould be no opportunity for newly formed organisations to 
c laim that they should be included on the list according to that 
general principle . The more detailed and specific the list is , 
the less ability there is to assess the facts of individual 
instances and relate them to some broad principle with a view 
to the object or purpose which one wants to attain . 
The second approach which is discussed in the White Paper is 
the enactment of a definition of charity based o n Pemsel's 
classification . The White Paper states that this would be 
scarce 1 y less diff icu 1t than the "list " approach . There is no 
explanation of why it would be so difficu 1 t . The next comment 
in the White Paper is that as a classification the formulation 
has proved of enduring use but as a definition its advantages 
are much less compe 1 ling. It is diff icu 1 t to understand quite 
what this comment means. If the classification is to be enacted 
it wi 11 remain a classification, that is its nature . If it is 
somehow to be changed, the White Paper does not explain how. 
There is also no explanation of whether the enactment of 
PemseJ's classification would include the need to refer to the 
1601 preamble . The White Paper then highlights the 
disadvantages of such an approach . Namely, that if the 
enactment of the classification failed to preserve the present 
case law, the law would be thrown into confusion and 
uncertainty by depriving the courts of recourse to previous 
decisions when they were asked to interpret the new statutory 
provisions. This however, is not necessarily so. The judges 
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would be required to perform a simple statutory interpretation 
exercise. Without the confusion of the present case law and 
the necessity to find an analogy with the 1601 preamble, the 
resu 1 t could we 11 be a lot less confusing and uncertain. The 
White Paper then goes on to say that if, on the other hand, the 
enactment of Pemsel's classification did successfully preserve 
the present so called "valuable" case law, it is hard to see 
what the new definition would achieve . This is an obvious 
conclusion, since then the definition of charity would remain 
the same, Pemsel's classification as guideline (albeit now in a 
statute) , reference to the ancient preamble and the mass of 
case law all still intact . There would , in fact , be no new 
definition at all so it is odd that the White Paper considers this 
option in terms of a possible redefinition . 
The third option for redefinition which is discussed in the 
White Paper is to define charitable purposes as purposes 
beneficial to the comm unity. This option is again opposed by 
the White Paper . It is acknowledged in the White Paper that 
the approach would have the advantage of being simple, but 
then the dis advantages of such an approach are discussed. 
The main criticisms made in the White Paper are that such a 
definition would allow organisations not obviously for private 
benefit or profit to be admitted as charitable, that it would be 
too subjective and would expand the ambit of charity too far . I 
will deal with each of these criticisms in turn . 
To start with it is completely erroneous to say that such a 
defintion would allow organisations not obviously for private 
benefit or profit to be held charitable, There are many 
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organisations which are not for private benefit or profit but 
which would still not satisfy the requiremnt of being beneficial 
to the community . For example, a dangerous and immoral 
religious cu 1 t may not make a profit or be obvious 1 y for private 
benefit but it would not be held charitable under the "purposes 
b eneficial to the community" test . 
The second criticism made of this approach is that it would 
be too subjective, but this criticism could equally be made 
about the present law. Pemsel's fourth catergory involves 
exactly the same question as are the purposes beneficial to 
t he community? The only difference is that decisions made 
under Pemsel's fourth category must be made with reference to 
the 1601 preamble. This has not made the decisions any less 
subjective, it has just made them more confused and artificial , 
as the analogies with the preamble become more and more 
strained. The subjective question of pub lie benefit must also 
be applied to the other three categories in the Pemsel 
classification. So it is unfair to disregard this reformulation on 
the basis that it is too subjective when the present law is just 
as subjective. In any case it is better to argue out subjective 
decisions within the framework of a clear enunciated principle 
rather than clouded in a complex and sometimes illogical 
definition sti 11 tied down to an 388 year old statute. Moreover, 
if the idea of drawing up an exhaustive list of charitable 
purposes is to be rejected as too rigid and liable to be outdated 
too quick 1 y, then one has to accept that a flexible def in tion 
which can adapt to the changing views of society, must in vo 1 ve 
some kind of subjective decision . In admitting that the concept 
of charity changes with time, one is admitting that charity itself 
is a somewhat subjective term . It must then decided whether 
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Parliament should make the subjective decision and lay down a 
list of organisations and purposes it considers charitable or 
w hether it is preferable to leave the subjective decision to the 
judiciary or some other body . They can then make decisions on 
th e basis of some general principle such as "the purposes must 
b e beneficial to the community " . The latter seems to be the 
m ore desirable approach . That way each case can be dealt 
with on its individual facts and the decisions can easi 1 y adapt 
t o changing social needs . There is nothing wrong with leaving 
t hese types of decisions to judges . They have been making 
v alue judgments for years . They make a value judgment every 
time they decide what is reasonable , obscene or 
unconscionable , as long as they have a clear general principle 
t o guide them, then we must rely on their social acumen to 
make appropriate decisions . 
The third criticism the White Paper makes about defining 
charitable purposes as purposes beneficial to the community is 
t hat it would greatly expand the ambit of charity in ways which 
would be far from desirable. The first response to this 
criticism is that it may not be true . The present definition of 
charity is to a large extent based on the requirement of pub lie 
benefit so there is no reason to believe that this test of 
"purposes beneficial to the community" will greatly expand the 
ambit of charity . The second response to the criticism is that 
if the ambit of charity is to some extent expanded by this 
definition then that is a good thing . It is fair to say that if a 
purpose is beneficial to the community then it is charitable and 
deserves the privileges that government endows on charities . 
If that organisation has failed to be admitted as charitable 
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under the present law then it can really only be because it 
failed to be analogous to one of the purposes in the 1601 
preamble . Otherwise it would have fallen into Pemsel's fourth 
category of purposes beneficial to the community . It is 
unreasonable to deny an organisation charitable status merely 
b ecause it is not analogous to an ancient and obselete statute 
which is large 1 y irre le van t in this day and age . The expansion 
of charity would also put into practice the old legal maximum 
t hat the law favours charity - not as a subject of suit, but 
r ather as purpose to be maintained 103_ 
The White Paper then goes on to say that any attempt to 
make clearer what is meant by "public benefit " might be made 
by reference to existing case law and by incorporating the 
other heads of charity into the general formula . Suprisingly 
the White Paper is not so concerned about "depriving the courts 
of recourse to previous decisions" as they were in relation to 
the approach which involved enacting Pemsel's classification . 
Instead they are concerned that incorporating reference to 
existing case law into this last approach would merely be 
adding unnecessary detail which would ossify instead of 
simplify the law. It is true that if al 1 the case law inc 1 uding the 
necessity to ref er to the 1601 preamble was to be ref erred to 
when deciding what is for the public benefit then the definition 
would not have been much altered . However at least there 
would be overall general principle of "public benefit" or 
purposes beneficial to the community" (the White Paper does 
not seem to distinguish between these two) . This overal 1 
general principle would help to ensure that decisions were 
103 Above n 3 , 580. 
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focused in on the central issue. If reference to the existing 
case law could be used as a guide line and if there is no need to 
refer to the 1601 preamble at all , then the new definition 
becomes much more usefu 1. Not only do the courts have clear 
guiding general principle, they also have the freedom to finall y 
b reak away from the necessity to relate decisions to the 
ancient preamble and can begin to make decisions which are 
and can begin in keeping with the social values of the time . 
III A definition based on public benefit 
Some statutory definition based on "public benefit" or 
"purposes beneficial to the community" seems to be a large 
improvement on the present law. First it comes closer to the 
popular meaning of the word charity . This is a good thing, 
taxpayers want the government to support charities so it is fair 
that the government does in fact support the organisations 
which have long been accepted as charitable by the general 
pub lie. As Susan Bright say in a recent article on charity law 
reform: 104 
if pub lie confidence in the charitable sector is to ve 
maintained it is sure 1 y important for the de !in it ion of charity to 
match the pub lie conception of what charity is ... 
Second 1 y, such a definition is not vast 1 y different from the 
old definition, it is just clearer, simpler and no longer related 
to the 16 O 1 pre am b 1 e. Re lief of poverty, education and 
religious purposes which are for public benefit will still be 
104 Susan Bright "taking the lid off charity fraud" (1989) 139 New Law Journal , 711, 71 2. 
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held charitable . The fourth category in Pemsel's case wi
ll also 
be the same apart from the need at present to tie it to th
e 1601 
preamble . Fortunaltey wisdom has stretched the
 fourth 
category to meet changing social needs but a new de
finition 
based on public benefit would remove the need for "str
etching " 
the category and hiding decisions behind artificial an
alogies 
with the preamble . 
Objects which were of great importance in 1601 ar
e not 
nearly so important today. Social conditions have c
hanged . 
The marriage of poor maids is no longer a concern in 
today 's 
world . Many of the purposes referred to in the 1601 pr
eamble 
have now been taken over by the welfare state. For e
xample , 
the state has now taken over the role of educating the
 young 
and giving pensions to the aged. The Ministry of Works
 is the 
body which repairs bridges, ports and high ways . Tod
ay new 
purposes are considered charitable. Social justice, help
ing the 
disadvantaged, human rights and political consciousne
ss are 
all new charitable impulses . 1os 
Another advantage of having a definition of charities 
based 
on "public benefit" or "purposes beneficial to the commu
nity" is 
that it ensures that decisions are made according 
to this 
re 1 e van t and ration a 1 p r in c i p 1 e . At present the quest
ion too 
often becomes what is educational? What is religion? 
What is 
politics? The obsession with the meaning of these w
ords is 
clouding the real issue; that is what is charity? If it is
 agreed 
105 Vera Houghton discusses these changes in charitable impulses in an article "
The Changing Role of Charities" 
in the book Perimeters of Social Repair ediled by WHG Armylage and
 J Peel Academic Press, London 
New York San Fransisco 1978, 17 - 29. 
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that charity is activity done voluntarily for the public benefit 
then the questions can become relevant again, with a purported 
educational trust the concern will not necessarily be with 
whether the trust is educational (although if it is then the 
pub lie benefit almost al ways fol lows) but the primary question 
should be whether the trust is for the public benefit . Rather 
than having to agonisingly convince oneself that a trust 
providing squash courts to a college is educational, the task 
becomes that of proving that the squash courts are for the 
public benefit. And instead of having to discuss whether a 
trust is non-political in order for it to have charitable status, 
the task should be to prove that regardless of or because of its 
political nature the trust is for the pub lie benefit. Presen t1 y 
there is of course the fourth category of Pemsels case as a 
general pub lie benefit category but this is to be used with 
reference to 1 6 O 1 pre am b 1 e so that the question of pub li c 
benefit is shack led to the mediaeval ages and the re le van t 
question again becomes subsumed with irrelevant ones, this 
time in regards to analogies with the purposes in the preamble. 
On the who le, the question of pub lie benefit should be 
approached afresh. The question should be reapplied to each 
set of new facts and with regard to society's values at the time. 
However, to some extent previous decisions would be useful in 
helping judges to make the decision of what is for the public 
benefit, but only relevant case law should be referred to. 
Some cases which emphasise for instance the analogies with 
the 1601 preamble or the rule against politics should be 
ignored . Other cases, however, which directly discuss the 
concept of public benefit could be quite helpful. The concept 
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of pub lie benefit in vo 1 ves two close 1 y related issues. First, 
whether the purposes are in fact beneficial and secondly, 
whether the purposes are beneficial to the public. 
Traditionally the first of these questions has been shackled to 
the 1601 preamble and Pemsel's categories . With a new 
definition of charities based on public benefit the 1601 
preamble will no longer be relevant, but obviously purposes 
such as education, relief of poverty, and most religions will 
still be considered to be for the public benefit . What is 
beneficial to the public is something which will change through 
time and charity law has to be flexible enough to keep up with 
these changes. 
The second issue focuses on whether the purpose is of a 
sufficiently public nature and the present case law is useful in 
regards to this issue. To be of a sufficient pub lie nature the 
trust must be for the benefit of the public or a section of the 
pub lie as opposed to being for the benefit of particular 
individuals or a f 1 uctuating body of private individuals.. In 
Verge v Somerville 106 Lord Wenbury said that for a trust to be 
for the public benefit it had to be for "an appreciably important 
section of the community." In Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities 
Trust Co L td 101 it was said that to be charitable the number of 
po s s i b 1 e be n e f i c i ar i e s must not be numeric a 11 y neg 1i g i b 1 e and 
that an aggregate of individuals ascertained by reference to 
some personal nexus, such as blood or con tract, was not the 
pub lie, or the section of the pub lie for this purpose. Th us in NZ 
106 
107 
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Society of Accountants v Commissioners of Inland Reven ue108 
fidelity funds which benefited persons whose money had been 
stolen by an accountant or soliciter, were held not charitable . 
The persons benefited as individuals and only as a result of 
the contractual or fiduciary relationship between the 
defaulting practitioner and the claimant . The Accountants 109 
case does however , also discuss the possibility of a slightly 
different test ie that whether a trust is public or private is a 
matter of degree in which the existence of a tie of blood or 
contract is but a feature to be considered . This was the 
approach taken in Dingle v Turner 11 0 and Lord MacDermott who 
dissented in the Oppenheim case . This approach explains why 
trusts for the relief of poverty do not fail merely because of a 
nexus between the beneficiaries . This is because the purpose 
of re 1 i e f of poverty is of such an a 1 t r u is tic nature that there is 
an indirect benefit ot the rest of the pub lie. Similar 1 y the 
cases about cure 1 ty to animals are justified on the grounds that 
prevention of crue 1 ty promotes pub lie morality . This may also 
be the approach which was taken by Richardson J in the 
Accountants case when he considered whether the public as a 
whole benefited from the fidelity funds. He concluded that the 
peace of mind that the public may gain from the awareness 
that if at some time their money is stolen by a lawyer or 
accountant they will have ultimate recourse to a fidelity fund, 
is too remote and nebulous to be regarded as beneficial to the 
public. Presumably if Richardson J had found some real, 
albeit, indirect benefit to the public he would have held the 
108 
109 
110 
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trust charitable regardless of the fact that the purpose only 
directly benefited a group of individuals ascertained by 
personal nexus . This approach seems preferable to the strict 
Oppenheim principle. The more flexible approach allows the 
courts to look beyond a personal nexus between indirect 
beneficiaries and consider how many individuals are benefiting 
and whether the rest of the public is somehow benefited 
indirectly in such an altruistic or eleemosynary way as to 
enable the purposes to be described as charitable . 
It is rare, however, for the courts to go as far as granting 
charitable status to a trust which is of indirect benefit to the 
who le community but not also tangi b 1 y and directly beneficial 
to some other section of the community, however small . The 
on 1 y trusts to which the courts have granted charitable status 
on this basis are those for the prevention of crue 1 ty to animals . 
However, in the future, if a definition was based on public 
benefit, perhaps the courts would become more willing to 
consider the possibility of granting charitable status to trusts 
which confer a significant indirect benefit on the whole 
community. 
To some extent a decision as to public benefit will be 
influenced by the purposes of the trust. Lord Somerville 
mentions this in Baddeley and points out that a trust for 
promotion of religion benefiting a very smal 1 class could be 
he 1 d char it a b 1 e but that a re creation a 1 trust for ex c 1 us iv e use 
by the same class would not be charitable (although if it was 
for the use of the whole community it would be) . Although 
Lord Somervi 11 does not exp lain why this is so, it is probab 1 y 
52 
because the religious trust not only confers a direct benefit on 
the small class, but it also confers an indirect benefit on the 
rest of the community (eg by increasing moral standards and 
encouraging man to give to others) . The recreational trust on 
the other hand is of much less significance in terms of indirect 
benefit to the public so it needs to directly benefit a significant 
section of the community in order to satisfy the public benefit 
requirement . 
The question of whether or not a trust can fairly be said to 
be for the public benefit is a question of degree . A pragmatic 
approach to ascertaining public benefit is required along with a 
willingness to assume the responsibilities of discretion by 
considering the unique circumstances of each individual case in 
the light of society's values at the time . 
In regards to political activity this new definition based on 
public benefit would mean that judges would no longer simply 
assume that because an object is political it is not charitable . 
The question of public benefit would have to be confronted. 
Obscure dangerous religious cults and the propagation of 
foolish views devoid of foundation may not be granted 
charitable status . They may be religious but the question of 
pub lie benefit might not be so easi 1 y satisfied if the courts 
were to look at them afresh. Some humanist trusts on the 
other hand, may well be granted charitable status under the 
new definition . Many of the sporting trusts now denied 
charitable status may also gain charitable status under the 
new definition. This is especially so since modern opinion is of 
the view that healthy sport and fitness are for the public 
I 
\ 
I 
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benefit and also the cases themselves in this area admit that 
sporting trusts can be for the public benefit .111 Poverty trusts 
would also have to satisfy the requirement of public benefit 
(they do not in the present definition) . This however would not 
be diff icu 1 t for most poverty trusts. As Lord Evershed MR said 
i n Re Scarisbrick;112 "the relief of poverty is of so altrustic a 
character that the public element may necessarily be inferred 
thereby" . 
C Fiscal and non-Fiscal Privileges 
Another approach to the reform of charity law, which has 
been suggested from time to time, is to separate the questions 
of fiscal and non-fiscal privileges. 
Cross : 113 
In the words of Lord 
the question whether a trust to further some 
purpose is so little like 1 y to benefit the pub lie that it 
ought to be declared invalid and the question whether it 
is likely to confer such great benefits on the public that 
it should enjoy fiscal immunity are really two quite 
different questions . The solution would be to separate 
them and to say ... that only some charities should 
enjoy fiscal privileges ... 
In a recent article on charity reform Susan Bright also 
argues that the way ahead is to separate en tit lemen t to fiscal 
privilege from entitlement to essential validity and charitable 
111 
112 
113 
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status. 114 She suggests that all purposes which are for the 
pub lie benefit should be granted charitable status but that not 
all of these charities should be granted fiscal privileges . 
Bright considers that the question of which charities should 
receive fiscal privileges and how much they should each 
receive is basically a political question of resource al location . 
Bright then prefers that the government make the decision as 
to the granting of fiscal privileges and the decision would 
presumably be made on the basis of the preceived degree of 
public beneift of a particular charity . The perceived public 
benefit would relate to the particular policy objectives and 
goals of the government in power . Brihgt argues that it would 
be advantageous to open up fiscal privileges to the democratic 
processes. 
But is it appropriate for these decisions to be made by 
government? This will result in tax privileges changing every 
few years with the change in government . Furthermore how 
can the government possibly attempt to rate the degree of 
public benefit a particular purpose confers? In many cases it 
is hard enough for the courts to determine whether a purpose 
is for the public benefit per se without the task of putting a 
value on the degree of public benefit . Surely it is easier and 
more realistic to accept that the taxpayers who provide the tax 
privileges are prepared to have these privileges endowed on 
all charities . As the Newark Committee commented "a dural 
law of charity, a fiscal law and a non-fiscal law, would be 
man if est 1 y in convenient ." 115 
114 Above n 80. 
115 Newark Committee Report (CMND 396) para 18. 
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D SHOULD IT BE A STATUTORY DEFINITION? 
If charity is to be redefined, it must be decided whether
 such 
redefinition should take the form of a statutory defini
tion or 
whether any such developments should be left in the ha
nds of 
the judiciary. There is concern that a statutory defini
tion of 
charity may cause fresh trouble and that the f lexi bi li ty
 of the 
common law would be lost .116 For example the White
 Paper 
states that attempting to make a statutory definition of 
charity 
would be "fraught with difficu 1 ty, and might put at ri
sk the 
flexibility of the present law which is both its greatest s
trength 
and its most valuable feature." 117 But the so called "flex
ibility" 
of the common law in this branch of law seems all to
 often 
"arbitariness" and "vagueness". As :Keeton and Sherida
n have 
pointedly observed:118 
"The present judge made law is flexible only in so far 
as the technicality of distinction has caused 
uncertainty. Decisions are based on verbal subtleties 
rather than principles of recognition of changing public 
needs in a rapidly changing society.N 
Part of the reluctance to enact a statutory defin
ition 
probably stems from a fear that perhaps in another five
 or ten 
years the courts would find their hands tied too much a
nd that 
it would be impossible to extend the boundaries as can 
now be 
done. There is no reason however why a statutory de
finition 
11 6 See for example: A Sheridan and J Keeton The Modern Law of Chari
ties 1983, 58, 59 and G.W Keeton 
"The Charity Muddle" (1949) Current Legal Problems 86, 102. 
117 Above n 16, 6. 
11 8 GW Keeton and LA Sheridan The Modern Law of Charities (1971), 47
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should be rigid and unable to adapt to changing social needs . 
It should be possible for a statutory definition to be in broad 
terms so as to enunciate some general principle without 
spelling it out in great detai 1. 
Many writers do consider a statutory definition to be 
appropriate 119 Enacting a new statutory definition would give 
judges a clear principle to work from and could clear up some 
of the tangles in the present law, although not necessarily 
involve abolishing all the precedents. A statutory definition 
would not on 1 y have the advantage of making things clearer for 
the judges it would also have the advantage of giving the 
layperson access to the legal definition of charity. At present 
the average layperson has no way of easily finding out the 
legal definition of charity unless he is prepared to wade 
through case law or legal textbooks of to pay a lawyer to 
advise him. In New Zealand there is not even a Charity 
Commission (as in England) to give advice on such matters. At 
present there is only the 1601 preamble which comes even 
remotely close to a statutory definition . It is time to remove 
this from the law once and for all and enact a broad definition 
which will serve as a new starting point. 
E WHO SHOULD DECIDE? 
So far this paper has large 1 y assumed that the judiciary is 
the appropriate body for making the decision as to what and 
what is not charity . It could be, however, that the law ought to 
al low a different body to make these decisions . The judiciary 
119 From example see above n 93 , 94 and 49. 
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is re 1 uctan t to conscious 1 y assume the responsi bi 1i ty of 
charting the changing area of social need and in ef!ect be the 
arbiter of social policy at any given time . Its members seem to 
pref er the application of rigid sett led rules . In an article about 
charity law, Brady comments that the courts : 120 
... rightly take the view that it is the business of the 
legislature to mediate social policy and it is not 
without significance that our law of charity remains 
firmly rooted in the last legislative attempt to do so in 
the ear 1 y seven teen th cen try" 
But is it so obviously the job of the legislature to mediate 
every detail of social policy? Certainly it is often appropriate 
for the legislature to lay down some general principles to 
guide the judiciary in its decision making . But it is inevitable 
that judges wi 11 sometimes be left with a certian degree of 
discretion. In many cases today judges will have to make social 
and moral value judgments as :Keeton and Bentham say. We 
must learn to re 1 y on a high degree of judicial valour and upon 
the social acumen of the judges . In the area of political trusts 
judges seem the most reluctant to make any kind of value 
judgements. As has already been pointed out this is probab 1 y 
because they fear that it will result in prejudice to their much 
hallowed impartiality. 
If judges are to un wi 1 ling so make socially responsible 
decisions on charity then it has been suggested that a different 
body should be al lowed to make these decisions . 121 Perhaps an 
120 See above n 93 . 
121 See above n 66. 
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independent body could be set up which could have the
 
responsibility of deciding whether various organisations are
 
charitable or not . Maybe they could also take up the role of
 
supervising charities · accounting standards and have powers to
 
prevent misappropriation of funds etc . In England a Charity
 
Commission was set up in 1960 122 to perform these types of
 
activities. The Commission has the general function of
 
promoting the effective use of charitable resources by
 
encouraging the development of better methods of
 
administration . They maintain a central register of all
 
charities in Eng land and Wales . Registration of an organisation
 
by the Commission is confirmation of its charitable status and
 
as a consequence the Commission must be satisfied beyond
 
doubt that the organisation can be properly legally defined as
 
a charity. The decisions about charitable status are made in
 
accordance with the present legal definition of charity and
 
appeals lie to the High Court against any decision made by the
 
Commission regarding registration. So ultimately it is still the
 
judiciary which is making the final decisions as to what and
 
what is not charitable. The Charity Commission is not a totally
 
independan t body, because it is sti 11 bound to follow the courts·
 
decisions . So the Commission cannot register po 1i tical trusts
 
as charitable even though they do not have a "hallowed
 
impartali ty" to protect as does the judiciary . And yet many
 
people would be wary of a system where important decisions
 
are made and there is no recourse to the courts . 
Perhaps after all the judiciary do have to accept the 
responsibility of making socially responsive decisons in the
 
122 The constitition of the Charity Commission is set out in the first schedule t
o the Charities Act 1960. 
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area of charity, it cannot and indeed should not be aiming to 
escape all types of value judgment . The law is not a totally 
rigid objective body of rules, it must be flexible enough to 
permit change. If the courts are given some clearer legislative 
guide lines for the discharge of their responsibility of deciding 
what is and what is not a charity then they should be capable 
of successfully meeting the challenge . 
PART V CONCLUSION 
The present legal definition of charity is failing to meet 
contemporary demands . It is failing because it is not based on 
a rational, flexible general principle but rather it is based on 
the preamble to a statute enacted in the Elizabethan era. For 
years writers have pointed out the deficiencies of the present 
definition and for years Parliament has failed to take up the 
challenge of redefining charity. The time has well and truly 
come for Parliament to seek to establish a new and modern 
definition of charity. 
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